University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2010

Immunity for Vaccine Manufacturers: The Vaccine
Act and Preemption of Design Defect Claims
Eva B. Stensvad

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stensvad, Eva B., "Immunity for Vaccine Manufacturers: The Vaccine Act and Preemption of Design Defect Claims" (2010). Minnesota
Law Review. 435.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/435

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
Immunity for Vaccine Manufacturers: The
Vaccine Act and Preemption of Design Defect
Claims
Eva B. Stensvad∗
Stefan Ferrari was a normal toddler until the day he suddenly stopped talking.1 The now eleven-year-old autistic boy’s
parents blame the booster shots he received when he was eighteen months old.2 Hannah Bruesewitz was a healthy infant until
she developed a seizure disorder following her third diphtheriatetanus-pertussis (DTP) vaccine when she was six months old.3
She is now an eighteen-year-old with a residual seizure disorder and developmental delay who will require special medical
care for the rest of her life.4 In Stefan’s case, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act (Vaccine Act) does not preempt all design defect claims if a
safer alternative vaccine was known.5 In Pennsylvania, where
Hannah resides, the Third Circuit interpreted the Vaccine Act
to bar all such claims against vaccine manufacturers.6 In other
words, Stefan is allowed to sue the vaccine manufacturer for
his injuries; Hannah is not.
∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; M.D. 2007,
Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine; B.A. 2003, Northwestern University. I would like to thank Professor Ralph Hall, Anna Hickman,
and Joe Hansen for their invaluable guidance and comments, as well as Scott
Jahnke and the Editors and Staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their hard
work in editing this Note. Finally, my greatest thanks to my husband, Karl,
and son, Andrew, for their endless support, patience, encouragement, and
love. Copyright © 2010 by Eva B. Stensvad.
1. Bill Rankin, Allow Vaccine Suit, Parents Ask Justices, ATLANTA J.CONST., May 21, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/
metro/stories/2008/05/21/vaccine.html?cxntlid=inform_artr.
2. Id.
3. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010).
4. Id.
5. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 237–38 (Ga. 2008).
6. Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 255.
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Vaccines are one of medicine’s greatest accomplishments.7
They prevent many potentially lethal and debilitating diseases.8 Even today, as fears of new influenza pandemics abound,
there is a desperate rush to access vaccines to ward off these
unknown dangers.9
Despite all the benefits vaccines afford, they also carry
some risk of side effects, many of which are either unknown or
unpredictable.10 Currently, there are over 5000 cases in Vaccine Court11 in which families allege that vaccines containing
thimerosal, a mercury derivative, caused their children to develop autism.12 Increased vaccine litigation could potentially
discourage manufacturers from remaining in the vaccine market, thus threatening the vaccine supply and the public
health.13
The risk of vaccine shortages is a real possibility. Between
2001 and 2002 there were nationwide shortages of eight of the
eleven recommended childhood vaccines.14 Only four manufacturers produce nearly all of the pediatric vaccines available in
7. See CDC, Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States,
1900–1999, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 241, 241 (1999) (listing
vaccination at the top of the list of the ten great public health achievements).
8. CDC, Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children—United
States, 1900–1998, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243, 245 (1999).
9. See Maura Lerner, Flu Vaccine Shortage Shutters Walk-In Clinics, For
Now, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.startribune
.com/lifestyle/health/60339972.html (describing flu-shot clinic cancellations due
to shortages).
10. See Possible Side-Effects From Vaccines, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/
vaccines/vac-gen/side-effects.htm (last modified June 3, 2010) (discussing the
many possible side effects from various vaccines).
11. The Vaccine Act created a special court within the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims, presided over by Special Masters that adjudicates all vaccine claims
processed pursuant to the requirements of the Vaccine Act. See Vaccine Program/Office of Special Masters, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS, http://www.uscfc
.uscourts.gov/vaccine-programoffice-special-masters (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
12. See About the Omnibus Autism Proceeding, HEALTH RESOURCES &
SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/omnibusproceeding
.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2010) (explaining that as of August 2010, there
were over 5000 cases involving claims of vaccine-related autism awaiting adjudication).
13. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6345 (explaining that due to an increase in vaccine litigation, the price
of vaccines increased, the number of vaccine manufacturers decreased, and the
level of immunization decreased).
14. Losing Momentum: Are Childhood Vaccine Supplies Adequate?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ.,
Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Losing Momentum]
(statement of Sen. Jack Reed).
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the United States.15 Five such vaccines are produced by only
one manufacturer.16 The loss of any manufacturer from the
market has the potential to cripple the vaccine supply. In 2004,
one British manufacturer encountered production difficulties,
resulting in a loss of half of the United States’ supply of the flu
vaccine.17 In 2009, there were national shortages of the seasonal flu vaccine as well as the novel H1N1 flu vaccine due to increased demand on an already strained supply.18 The burden of
litigation may overwhelm an already struggling production system.
At the heart of this issue is the Vaccine Act,19 which sought
to address the issues of vaccine safety, compensation for vaccine-related injuries, and liability protection for vaccine manufacturers.20 The Act expressly prohibits litigation arising from
“side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine
was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.”21 This language has been interpreted in
two different ways. In Ferrari, the court found that the statute
only preempts defective design litigation after it has been determined, on a case-by-case basis, that the injury was, in fact,
“unavoidable.”22 In Bruesewitz, the court held that the statute
preempts all vaccine design defect claims.23 The Ferrari interpretation may affect vaccine manufacturers’ continued participation in the market, and the Bruesewitz interpretation may
affect public confidence in vaccination programs. The safety of
vaccines, protection of public health, and security of the vaccine
supply all depend on this critical distinction.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id. at 4 (statement of Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care—Public
Health Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office).
17. Andrew Pollack, U.S. Will Miss Half Its Supply of Flu Vaccine, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004, at A1.
18. See, e.g., Delthia Ricks, Seasonal Flu Vaccine Shortage Hits Long Island, NEWSDAY, Oct. 16, 2009, at A8 (describing the suspension of flu clinics
resulting from a shortage of the seasonal flu vaccine); Lerner, supra note 9
(reporting that vaccine demand is overwhelming the supply as manufacturers
try to produce two different flu vaccines).
19. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa10 to -34 (2006).
20. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 5–7 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6346–48.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22 (emphasis added).
22. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 242 (Ga. 2008).
23. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 255 (3d Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010).
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This Note argues that both the Bruesewitz and Ferrari
courts got it wrong. The text of the Vaccine Act requires some
case-by-case analysis to determine whether a particular vaccine
is unavoidably unsafe. Congress, however, has already conducted these analyses with respect to the federally encouraged
pediatric vaccines. Therefore, the Vaccine Act preempts design
defect claims with respect to these particular vaccines. Part I
provides an overview of the role and regulation of vaccines, introduces the text and history of the Vaccine Act, and discusses
the current controversy involving vaccine-related injuries and
recent preemption jurisprudence. Part II critiques the arguments in favor of and against preemption, closely examining
the plain text of the Vaccine Act and analyzing Congress’s role
in creating and regulating national vaccine policy. Part III argues that although the Act requires an analysis to determine
whether a particular vaccine’s benefits justify its risks, Congress is in a better position than judges or juries to conduct
these inquiries. As the nation faces threats of global pandemics
and vaccine shortages, it is essential that the Vaccine Act is interpreted to ensure the continued production, development, and
safety of lifesaving vaccines, while adequately protecting those
who are harmed as a result of such products.
I. VACCINE REGULATION, LEGISLATION, AND
PREEMPTION
Vaccination is one of the greatest public health achievements in the United States.24 It has greatly reduced the morbidity of diseases that once devastated the population, such as
smallpox, measles, poliomyelitis, diphtheria, and pertussis.25
Every state, and the District of Columbia, recognizes that vaccines are critical to maintain public health, and has instituted
mandatory immunization requirements for children.26 Despite
the many benefits vaccines confer upon society, they also occasionally injure those whom they are supposed to protect.27 This
has led to rising fears of vaccines and some resistance to vac24. CDC, supra note 7, at 241.
25. CDC, supra note 8, at 245 tbl.2. Some diseases have nearly, if not
completely, been eradicated through vaccination programs. See id.
26. CDC, CHILDCARE AND SCHOOL VACCINATION REQUIREMENTS: 2007–
2008, at 4, available at http://www2a.cdc.gov/nip/schoolsurv/combinedlaws2007
.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
27. Vaccine Safety and Adverse Events, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/
vac-gen/safety/default.htm (last modified Nov. 19, 2009) (explaining that all
vaccines carry some risk).
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cination programs.28 Predictably, this has also led to civil litigation against vaccine manufacturers.29
This Part provides a brief overview of the role of the federal government in vaccine regulation and sets forth the contents
and history of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986.30 This Part then introduces the current issues surrounding vaccination, including the two recent court decisions which
have brought to the forefront the question of whether the Vaccine Act preempts certain civil claims against vaccine manufacturers.31
A. FEDERAL REGULATION OF VACCINES
The federal government has a long history of involvement
in the effort to prevent childhood disease and regulate vaccine
development and production, beginning with the Virus Serums
and Toxins Act of 1902.32 Since then, it has taken an increasingly active role in promoting vaccine development and administration through numerous legislative acts, federal grants, and
nationwide immunization initiatives.33 The National Vaccine
Program Office (NVPO), within the United States Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for coordinating the activities of the many federal agencies involved in
immunization efforts, including the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC), Agency for International Development (USAID), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service (CMS), Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Food and Drug Administration

28. See, e.g., Alice Park, How Safe Are Vaccines?, TIME, June 2, 2008, at
36, 38 (explaining that “increasing numbers of parents are raising questions
about whether vaccines . . . are actually harmful to children”).
29. See About the Omnibus Autism Proceeding, supra note 12 (noting that
there are more than 5000 vaccine-related autism cases currently awaiting adjudication).
30. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1
to -34 (2006).
31. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130
S. Ct. 1734 (2010); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. 2008).
32. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH & THE ENV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON
ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS 44 (Comm.
Print 1986) [hereinafter CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS]; see also INST. OF MED.,
VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 16–17 (1985) (describing the history of federal vaccine regulation and legislation).
33. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 44 –49 (describing
congressional efforts to increase immunization levels throughout the nation).

320

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:315

(FDA), among others.34 The CDC contracts for vaccine prices35
and the federal government purchases over fifty percent of the
childhood vaccines administered in the United States each
year.36 Federal encouragement of state vaccination programs
has been highly successful, as all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have enacted laws requiring childhood immunizations.37
The two main programs through which the federal government directs vaccine policy are the Vaccines for Children
(VFC) program, which provides free vaccines to children in
need,38 and the Section 317 Immunization Grant Program,39
which provides grants to all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and other urban areas and territories, to provide vaccines
to those not served by the VFC program.40 The federal Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), representing
eight different federal agencies and twenty-six nongovernment
agencies,41 examines in detail the risks, benefits, costs, and
public health need for each childhood vaccine.42 The ACIP
draws upon a variety of sources of information, including “pub34. National Vaccine Program Office, U.S. DEPARMENTT HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/about.html (last modified Sept. 27, 2006).
The NVPO works to fulfill the goals of the National Vaccine Plan, which “provides a framework, including goals, objectives, and strategies, for pursuing the
prevention of infectious diseases through immunizations.” Id.
35. See CDC Vaccine Price List, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/
vfc/cdc-vac-price-list.htm (last updated Oct. 6, 2010) (listing current vaccine
contract prices).
36. Losing Momentum, supra note 14, at 4 (statement of Janet Heinrich,
Director, Health Care—Public Health Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office).
37. CDC, supra note 26, at 4.
38. Vaccines for Children Program (VFC), CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/
vaccines/programs/vfc/default.htm (last modified Oct. 7, 2010).
39. See Public Health Act, Pub. L. No. 87-868, § 317, 76 Stat. 1155, 1155–
56 (1962) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 247b (2006)); Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention: Section 317 Immunization Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/reports/plans/section
317imunization_cdc.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (describing recent appropriations to the Section 317 Immunization Program).
40. See CDC, IMMUNIZATION GRANT PROGRAM (SECTION 317) (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/NCIRD/progbriefs/downloads/grant-317.pdf. A majority of the grants allocated under section 317 are for routine childhood vaccines. Id.
41. See Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), CDC, http://
www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/default.htm (last modified Oct. 14, 2010).
42. See CDC, General Recommendations on Immunization, 55 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1–2 (2006) (discussing the process by which the
ACIP makes vaccine recommendations).
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lished and unpublished studies . . . and expert opinion[s] of
public health officials and specialists in clinical and preventive
medicine,” in order to generate a list of recommended vaccines
for children.43 The Secretary of HHS then uses these recommendations in selecting vaccines for the various federal vaccine
programs.44
The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER)
within the FDA has primary responsibility for ensuring vaccine
safety.45 The FDA regulates vaccines as “biological products”
pursuant to the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).46 There are
stringent regulations encompassing every aspect of vaccination,
including licensing,47 testing,48 manufacturing,49 and postmarket reporting.50 The Secretary of HHS has the authority to
suspend or revoke licenses,51 and there are numerous provisions regarding post-market surveillance and risk evaluation.52
The FDA’s comprehensive and “rigorous” review of vaccines
plays a crucial role in assuring the safety and efficacy of childhood vaccines.53
The federal government is extensively involved in immunization in the United States. It plays a role in vaccine development, marketing, licensing, distribution, and regulation.
Through its many agencies, vaccination programs, and advisory
committees, it is a major force in shaping national vaccine policy.

43. Id. at 1.
44. See ACIP Charter, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/ACIP/charter
.htm (last updated Apr. 6, 2010) (describing ACIP’s provision of advice and
guidance to the HHS, the CDC, and the states for the implementation of vaccination programs).
45. See Vaccines, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/
default.htm (last updated Mar. 29, 2010).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006).
47. 21 C.F.R. §§ 601.1–.29 (2010).
48. Id. § 601.25.
49. Id. §§ 600.10–.15.
50. Id. §§ 600.80, 601.70. For a detailed description of FDA regulation of
vaccines, see Linda A. Willett, Note, DPT Vaccine-Related Injury Actions: Federal Preemption Reconsidered, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 373 (1988) and Katherine
Davenport, Vaccines and the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
(Apr. 10, 2000) (unpublished student paper, Harvard Law School), available
at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/search/toc.php3?handle=HLS.Library.Leda/
davenportk-vaccines_national_vaccine.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(A) (2006).
52. See, e.g., id. § 262(a)(2)(D), (d), (j).
53. See Vaccines, supra note 45.
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B. VACCINE ACT LITIGATION
Despite all the safety mechanisms in place, injuries from
vaccines still occur. These injuries sometimes give rise to litigation, which in turn prompts a flurry of legislative action. Such
was the case when the Vaccine Act was enacted. In the early
1980s, a series of problems emerged that threatened the nation’s immunization efforts. As immunization programs gained
popularity and more children received vaccinations, there was
also a concurrent increase in public awareness of vaccinerelated injuries.54 Those suffering from such injuries sought recompense through civil litigation, but the system was timeconsuming, expensive, and often inadequate.55 Rising litigation
against vaccine manufacturers also resulted in difficulties procuring affordable product liability insurance, increased vaccine
prices, and fewer vaccine manufacturers in the market.56 By
1986, there was only one manufacturer of the polio vaccine, one
manufacturer of the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine, and
two manufacturers of the DTP vaccine.57 The “unstable and
unpredictable childhood vaccine market [made] the threat of
vaccine shortages a real possibility” and undermined the national goal of increasing the “availability and use of vaccines to
prevent childhood diseases.”58 The country was dangerously
close to vaccine shortages and a possible “resurgence of preventable diseases.”59
Congress sought a solution that would address both the inadequate approach to compensating those injured by recommended vaccines and the instability and unpredictability of the
childhood vaccine market that threatened the nation’s vaccine
supply.60 That solution was the Vaccine Act.61 Part A of the Act
54. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 21.
55. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6347.
56. See id. at 4, 6. The price of one vaccine reportedly increased by as much
as 2000 percent in only two years. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32,
at 60.
57. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id. at 7. Describing the threat of a nationwide vaccine shortage, one
article states: “If there were [a] . . . clock marking the time remaining until
vaccines become either unavailable or unacceptable . . . it would stand perilously close to midnight in the United States.” Wendy K. Mariner & Mary E.
Clark, Confronting the Immunization Problem: Proposals for Compensation
Reform, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 703, 703 (1986), available at http://www.ncbi
.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1646786/pdf/amjph00269-0097.pdf.
60. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7.
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created a no-fault compensation program to ensure faster and
easier recovery for those injured by vaccines.62 It also established a Vaccine Court to hear these claims,63 in which injured
parties are not required to prove causation or negligence64 if
their injuries are consistent with the Vaccine Injury Table
created by the Act.65 Congress hoped this program would provide better compensation for injured parties, while simultaneously diverting claims away from litigation against vaccine
manufacturers.66 Part B of the Act deals with the remedies
available to an injured party should he or she reject the judgment of the Vaccine Court.67 Finally, Part C provides for various mechanisms to ensure vaccine safety, including a recording
and reporting system68 and a mandate for safer childhood vaccines.69
Under Part B, if an individual rejects the judgment of the
Vaccine Court, he or she may pursue traditional litigation
against the vaccine manufacturer according to state law, except
as provided in various parts of section 22 of the Act.70 Section
22(b)(1) states that a vaccine manufacturer shall not be liable
for a “vaccine-related injury or death . . . [that] resulted from
side effects that were unavoidable” if “the vaccine was properly
prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.”71 This language was adopted from comment k of section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which carves out an
exception to strict liability of product manufacturers for products that are “unavoidably unsafe.”72 Under comment k, “ap61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006).
62. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 3.
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (1986).
64. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 12.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (2006). The Vaccine Injury Table contains known
adverse events associated with particular vaccines and provides the basis for
compensation if an individual suffers from one of the included events during
the required time period. See id. For a detailed discussion of the compensation
program procedure, see Victor E. Schwartz, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 387, 389–92 (1987).
66. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 12–13.
67. Id. at 3.
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-25.
69. See id. § 300aa-27.
70. See id. § 300aa-22. Sections 22(b), (c) and (e) are the provisions that
may affect state law. See id.
71. Id. § 300aa-22(b)(1).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
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parently useful and desirable product[s]” which have a known
risk and are “quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use” are considered “unavoidably unsafe.”73 If “[s]uch a product [is] properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, [then it] is not
defective,” and the product’s manufacturer is not held strictly
liable.74
This section of the Vaccine Act has created enormous controversy. It shields manufacturers from some types of design
defect liability,75 but the limits of this preemption clause are
not clearly defined. Because federal laws are “the supreme Law
of the Land,”76 and any “state laws that conflict with federal
law are ‘without effect,’”77 it is important to define the precise
scope of this preemptive language. Courts generally agree that
the clause encompasses design defect claims based in both
strict liability and negligence.78 They do not agree, however, as
to whether all vaccines are, by definition, “unavoidably unsafe,”
or instead, whether a vaccine can only be classified as “unavoidably unsafe” after a case-by-case analysis of the specifically challenged design element of the vaccine and its allegedly
causal connection to a particular injury.79 Even if a case-bycase assessment is required for each vaccine, it is not clear from
the text who is supposed to make that determination—
Congress, administrative agencies, or courts?
Two cases recently analyzed the express preemption clause
in section 22(b)(1) of the Vaccine Act. In American Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
Vaccine Act does not preempt all design defect claims against

73. Id.
74. Id. Comment k points to the rabies vaccine as “[a]n outstanding example” of an “[u]navoidably unsafe product.” Id.
75. The three categories of defective products which give rise to liability
are manufacturing defects (“when the product departs from its intended design”), defective design (when the design itself carries unreasonable risks of
harm), and defect due to inadequate instructions or warnings. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
76. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
77. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (quoting Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
78. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2009),
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668
S.E.2d 236, 242 (Ga. 2008).
79. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 835–36
(Neb. 2000) (noting that courts have disagreed as to comment k’s application).
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vaccine manufacturers.80 The parents of an autistic boy
brought claims under strict liability and negligence, alleging
that the manufacturers could have designed a safer children’s
vaccine.81 The Ferrari court relied heavily upon the conditional
language of the statute,82 the desire to give meaning to the
word “unavoidable,”83 and subsequent legislative history stating that the Vaccine Act was not meant to “decide as a matter
of law whether vaccines were unavoidably unsafe or not,” but
that “[t]his question is left to the courts.”84 Ultimately, the
court found no “‘clear and manifest’ congressional purpose to
supplant state tort law,”85 and therefore concluded that section
22(b)(1) only preempted liability for defective designs “if it is
determined, on a case-by-case basis, that the particular vaccine
was unavoidably unsafe.”86
In Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc.,87 the Third Circuit rejected the
Ferrari court’s reasoning and held that the Vaccine Act expressly preempted design defect claims.88 The Bruesewitz court
did not consider the presence of the word “unavoidable” to be
dispositive, explaining that “it is always possible to construct
through hindsight . . . alternate wording that would render it
more clear.”89 The court rejected the legislative history upon
which the Ferrari court relied, finding it to be unreliable subsequent history that said little about the intent of the earlier
Congress that enacted the Vaccine Act.90 Instead, the court
reasoned that if a case-by-case analysis was needed for each
vaccine to determine whether the side effects were unavoidable,
then the preemption clause would effectively preempt nothing
at all, since all claims would be subject to some judicial evaluation.91 Therefore, it found a “clear and manifest” expression of
congressional intent to bar all design defect claims, without any
80. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 242.
81. Id. at 237.
82. See id. at 240 (“The conditional nature of this clause contemplates the
occurrence of side effects which are avoidable, and for which a vaccine manufacturer may be civilly liable.”).
83. See id. at 240 (refusing to read out words from a statute).
84. Id. at 241 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-391(I), at 691 (1987), reprinted
in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-364, 2313-365).
85. Id. at 242.
86. Id.
87. 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010).
88. Id. at 255.
89. Id. at 246.
90. See id. at 250.
91. See id. at 246.

326

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:315

“unavoidability” analysis. It concluded that at the very least,
Congress intended to preclude design defect claims concerning
the DTP vaccine at issue, since it was the design of the DTP
vaccine and the resulting litigation which spawned the Vaccine
Act.92
In reaching their conclusions, both courts referred to a
“presumption against preemption.”93 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that there is a presumption against federal
preemption, especially in areas traditionally regulated by the
states.94 When faced with equally plausible readings, the Court
opts to accept the reading disfavoring preemption,95 because it
assumes that the “historic police powers of the States [are] not
to be superseded . . . unless that [is] the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.”96 Recently, the Court applied this presumption in holding that failure-to-warn claims against manufacturers of pharmaceuticals are not impliedly preempted by
FDA approvals pursuant to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.97 The Court has also used this presumption to find that the
Medical Device Amendments do not expressly preempt negligent design claims regarding a product that has not been subjected to the FDA’s “rigorous” pre-market approval process.98
The Ferrari and Bruesewitz courts, however, did not find it necessary to rely upon this doctrine, since both found a “clear and
manifest” expression of congressional intent, albeit coming to
opposite conclusions.99

92. Id. at 250–51.
93. Id. at 240; Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 238–39
(Ga. 2008).
94. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
95. See id.
96. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
97. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009).
98. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477, 485 (1996).
99. There is some debate as to whether the presumption against preemption applies at all when dealing with an express preemption clause rather than
an issue of implied preemption. See Bates, 544 U.S. at 457 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the “presumption does not
apply . . . when Congress has included within a statute an express pre-emption
provision”); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 291–92 (2000) (arguing that the presumption against preemption makes little sense when used
to interpret an express preemption clause); Michael X. Imbroscio, Federal
Preemption in the Non-Drug Context After Wyeth v. Levine 15 (June 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cov.com/mimbroscio/ (arguing
that an “unrestrained ‘presumption against preemption’” doctrine could “emasculate” an otherwise appropriate express preemption clause).
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Thus, as it currently stands, individuals injured by vaccines in Georgia may sue vaccine manufacturers under any
theory of liability, but individuals similarly injured in Pennsylvania cannot. This inconsistency has drawn the attention of the
U.S. Supreme Court, which recently granted a writ of certiorari
in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc.100 The Supreme Court is now
poised to rule on the preemptive scope of the Vaccine Act.
C. VACCINATION CONTROVERSY TODAY
The issues that confronted the nation in 1986—such as
threats of vaccine shortages and demand for vaccines that exceeds the supply—are still in effect today.101 The loss of even
one vaccine manufacturer has the potential to cripple the nation’s vaccination programs.102 Meanwhile, an increasing number of parents are questioning the safety and necessity of childhood vaccines.103 They have become particularly concerned with
vaccines containing thimerosal, a mercury-containing compound that has been used as a preservative in vaccines since
the 1930s.104 Although preservatives are required to prevent
contamination in multi-dose vials of vaccines,105 a growing
number of parents suspect thimerosal is a cause of their children’s autism.106 As of August 2010, over 5600 cases alleging a
causal relationship between vaccinations and autism have been
filed in the Vaccine Court.107 So far, these claimants have not
fared well.108 If this trend continues, it is likely that they will
100. 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010).
101. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 9 (describing influenza vaccine shortages).
102. See Pollack, supra note 17, at A1 (discussing vaccine shortages resulting from the temporary suspension of one British manufacturer).
103. Park, supra note 28, at 38.
104. Thimerosal in Vaccines, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/
safetyavailability/vaccinesafety/ucm096228 (last updated Mar. 31, 2010).
105. See 21 C.F.R. § 610.15(a) (2010) (“Products in multiple-dose containers
shall contain a preservative . . . .”).
106. Autism, or Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs), are developmental
disabilities that cause communication, social, and behavioral challenges. Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs): What Should You Know?, CDC, http://www.cdc
.gov/ncbddd/autism/index.html (last updated June 24, 2009). Approximately
one in 110 children in the U.S. have an ASD. Id.
107. About the Omnibus Autism Proceeding, supra note 12.
108. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Statement from
the Department of Health and Human Services Regarding the Decisions of the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims in the Omnibus Autism Proceeding (Feb. 12,
2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/02/20090212a.html
(explaining that after careful review, the Special Masters in the Vaccine Court
have found no association between vaccines and autism).
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next try to bring their injury claims to court.109 An influx of
thousands of product liability claims has an even greater potential to permanently shut down the vaccine supply than the litigation that led to the passage of the Vaccine Act in 1986. If
these claims are preempted by the Vaccine Act, injured parties
will only be able to recover for design-related claims in the Vaccine Court, and vaccine manufacturers will have the security
they need to remain in the vaccine market. If these claims are
not preempted, injured parties will have the ability to pursue
recompense in any available venue, but manufacturers may
fear their increased exposure to liability and abandon vaccine
production in favor of more lucrative endeavors.
II. ARE ROUTINE CHILDHOOD VACCINES
“UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE” PRODUCTS?
The Vaccine Act’s express preemption clause110 exempts
vaccine manufacturers from liability for injuries that “resulted
from side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine
was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.”111 In determining the scope of that language, courts have had difficulty defining the word “unavoidable.” One possibility is that vaccine injuries are, by definition,
“unavoidable” whenever the vaccine is properly prepared and
accompanied by proper directions and warnings.112 This reading “essentially equate[s] FDA approval with a determination
that side effects are ‘unavoidable.’”113 Another interpretation
requires a preliminary case-by-case determination that the injuries could not have reasonably been avoided before those in-

109. See, e.g., Mary Holland, Help Preserve the Right to Bring Vaccine Injury Claims to Civil Court, AGE AUTISM (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www
.ageofautism.com/2009/08/help-preserve-the-right-to-bring-vaccine-injury-claims
-to-civil-court.html.
110. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 242 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding that section 22(b)(1) of the Vaccine Act contains an express preemption clause), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
112. See Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664
(S.D. Tex. 2004) (explaining that because “[t]he drafters of § 22(b) were obviously
aware of the different heads of products liability,” and only identified two of
these as determinative of unavoidability, “[i]f the alleged defect . . . does not
fall into one of these two enumerated categories, the defect is considered ‘unavoidable’”).
113. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 237 (Ga. 2008) (quoting Ferrari v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 650 S.E.2d 585, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)).
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juries are characterized as “unavoidable” for the purpose of
preemption.114
This Part demonstrates that although the statute is facially ambiguous, examination of comment k115 reveals that some
risk-benefit analysis is necessary before a vaccine’s side effects
and injuries are characterized as “unavoidable.” The contents of
the statute, along with Congress’s past and current behavior,
demonstrate that Congress is the body responsible for conducting these analyses. This Part shows that Congress has already
assumed this role as decisionmaker, and furthermore, that the
Congress-as-decisionmaker interpretation of section 22(b)(1) is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence.
A. SECTION 22(B)(1) REQUIRES CASE-BY-CASE
DETERMINATIONS OF UNAVOIDABILITY
The plain text of the statute does not clearly indicate its
preemptive scope.116 If the statute preempts all claims for injuries arising where there is no manufacturing defect or failure to
warn, then the word “unavoidable” is meaningless.117 The statute could have simply eliminated the words “that were unavoidable” and retained the same meaning.118 Yet giving full
effect to the word “unavoidable” would make the entire clause
pointless, because all side effects from vaccines are theoretically avoidable—a person can simply opt not to get vaccinated.
An examination of comment k of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, from which this language was borrowed,119 sheds some light on this matter. Comment k creates
114. See id.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
116. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (explaining that the first step of statutory construction of an express preemption
clause is to “focus on the plain wording”).
117. Courts strive to give meaning to every word in a statute, and would
disfavor such a reading. See Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 240 (refusing to read out
words from the statute); HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 83 (2008).
118. On the other hand, Congress could easily have drafted the statute to
explicitly preserve design defect claims, just as it did with manufacturing and
failure to warn claims. Section 22(b) could have read: “even though the vaccine
was properly designed, properly prepared, and was accompanied by proper directions and warnings.” Either way, this statute is “inartfully drafted.” Nitin
Shah, Note, When Injury Is Unavoidable: The Vaccine Act’s Limited Preemption of Design Defect Claims, 96 VA. L. REV. 199, 203, 219 (2010).
119. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 25–26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6366–67.
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an exception from strict liability design defect claims120 for
“[u]navoidably unsafe products.”121 These are “products which,
in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of
being made safe for their intended and ordinary use,” yet are
“apparently useful and desirable.”122 The comment sets forth
the rabies vaccine as an example of such a product, because although the vaccine can cause serious injuries, rabies itself is
fatal, and so “the use of the vaccine [is] fully justified.”123 The
comment, however, does not state that all vaccines are “unavoidably unsafe,” but rather “many other . . . vaccines” may
qualify for this exception.124 States that have adopted comment
k have interpreted it differently,125 but most require a case-bycase analysis of the risks and benefits of the specific product at
issue.126 Although there was no general agreement on the
meaning of comment k in 1986 when the Vaccine Act was
enacted,127 the language of the comment itself seems fairly
straightforward. The comment conducts a risk-benefit analysis
of the rabies vaccine, and in referring to “an apparently useful
and desirable product,” it is clear that some entity must make
this determination.128 In fact, one court acknowledged that it
was “expanding the literal interpretation of comment k” by
creating a per se rule that all FDA-approved prescription medications are “unavoidably unsafe.”129
120. Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the
Meaning and Policy Behind Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1146
(1985) (“[C]omment k deals with liability for design of . . . products.”).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 835 (Neb.
2000) (explaining that comment k “has been interpreted in a variety of ways in
other jurisdictions”).
126. See Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 726 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003) (“Most of the states that have adopted Comment k have applied it
in a more limited fashion and on a case-by-case basis.”); Toner v. Lederle
Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987) (finding that the comment only applies
“when the situation calls for it”). A minority of states do not require a case-bycase determination for FDA-approved pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., Young v. Key
Pharm., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64 (Wash. 1996) (“[A] separate determination of
whether a product is unavoidably unsafe need not be made on a case-by-case
basis if that product is a prescription drug.”).
127. See Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844 –45 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2003) (explaining that by 1986 courts had come to different conclusions as
to whether a case-by-case determination was required for prescription drugs).
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
129. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1991).
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The language of comment k and its adoption in the Vaccine
Act suggests that some case-by-case analysis is required to determine if a vaccine is “apparently useful and desirable,” despite its inherent risks, so as to justify its use. However, the
question remains as to whom this should be apparent.
B. CONGRESS DECIDES WHETHER A VACCINE IS UNAVOIDABLY
UNSAFE
The Bruesewitz130 and Ferrari131 courts grappled with the
question of whether section 22(b)(1) requires a case-by-case examination, but neither court considered who Congress intended
to conduct this inquiry or whether it had already been performed with respect to childhood vaccines.132 The text of the
Vaccine Act does not clearly express who should make these
case-by-case determinations, but the contents of the Act strongly suggest that Congress intended to assume this decisionmaking role. Although the legislative history of the Act is not
clear on this point, Congress has demonstrated through action
that it is the body responsible for making these decisions—it
did so long before the Vaccine Act and has continued to do so
since.
1. The Structure and Contents of the Vaccine Act: Congress’s
Role as Gatekeeper
Despite the lack of any clear statement in the text indicating that Congress intended to assume the task of conducting
risk-benefit analyses of childhood vaccines, the contents of the
Vaccine Act itself show that Congress contemplated a large role
for the federal government in making these determinations.
The Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS to establish a “National Vaccine Program to oversee and carry out Federal vaccine-related research, testing, licensing, production, and distribution activities concerning all vaccines.”133 It created a
National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) to make recom-

130. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010).
131. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 242 (Ga. 2008).
132. “‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every preemption case.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
133. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6345; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -2 (2006).
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mendations based on safety and efficacy.134 Subpart C of the
Vaccine Act135 is replete with provisions providing for the recording and reporting of adverse events,136 dissemination of
vaccine information,137 and promotion of research and development of safer childhood vaccines.138 Specifically, Congress
delegated to the Secretary of HHS the responsibility of establishing a “task force on safer childhood vaccines” and “mak[ing]
or assur[ing] improvements in . . . the licensing, manufacturing, processing, testing, labeling, warning, . . . administration,
. . . [and] surveillance” of vaccines “in order to reduce the risks
of adverse reactions.”139 Furthermore, the Act provides for the
involvement of multiple federal agencies in making such policy
and safety assessments.140
It is evident from these provisions that Congress sought to
take over the leadership role in making vaccine-related decisions. It delegated much of this responsibility to other agencies
and decisionmaking bodies, but ultimately assumed the responsibility for nationwide policies regarding the safety and efficacy of various childhood vaccines.
2. Legislative History of the Vaccine Act Is Unclear
The “regulatory context,” which served as the “catalyst for
passage” of the Act, can help illuminate Congress’s purpose.141
Prior to 1986, courts decided on a case-by-case basis whether a
vaccine was unavoidably unsafe142 and came to different conclusions.143 Vaccine manufacturers became concerned with
134. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-5 (2006). One of the functions of NVAC is to
“[r]ecommend research priorities” to improve vaccine safety and efficacy. National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC), U.S. DEPARMENT OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2010).
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-25 to -28.
136. Id. § 300aa-25.
137. Id. § 300aa-26.
138. Id. § 300aa-27.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., id. § 300aa-2(a)(7), (8) (mandating that the Director of the
Vaccine Program coordinate with federal agencies and nongovernmental entities to monitor vaccine safety, efficacy, and demand).
141. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519 (1992).
142. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Kan.
1986) (finding the Sabin Polio vaccine “unavoidably unsafe”).
143. Compare Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1497 (D. Kan.
1987) (refusing to find as a matter of law that the whole cell DTP vaccine is
unavoidably unsafe), with White v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 754
(Ohio 1988) (holding that the DTP vaccine containing whole cell pertussis is
unavoidably unsafe).
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their potential exposure to large damages awards and product
liability insurers became hesitant to provide insurance coverage to these manufacturers.144 For these reasons, vaccine manufacturers started to withdraw from the market, jeopardizing
the supply of childhood vaccines.145 Through the Vaccine Act,
Congress sought to provide more predictability with respect to
manufacturers’ liability.146 There was also a competing purpose
of the Vaccine Act—to ensure that those who suffered from vaccine-related injuries were able to secure adequate compensation.147 It is difficult to determine from these dueling legislative
purposes whether Congress intended to foreclose design defect
claims against manufacturers of childhood vaccines, since under either interpretation, one legislative purpose is promoted at
the expense of the other.
The legislative history of the Vaccine Act does little to clarify Congress’s intent.148 A House Report by the Committee on
Energy and Commerce (1986 Report) made it clear that Congress intended to make civil tort claims more difficult for plaintiffs, in exchange for providing them with “a comprehensive
and fair compensation system” in the Vaccine Court.149 The
concept of “unavoidably unsafe” “appl[ies] to the vaccines covered in the bill . . . [and] such products [are] not [to] be the subject of liability in the tort system.”150 Furthermore, unless there
is a manufacturing defect or failure-to-warn claim, people injured by vaccines covered by the Act “should pursue recompense in the compensation system, not the tort system.”151 The
1986 Report casts doubt on whether a court or jury could fairly
decide these cases in which a blameless child is pitted against
an impersonal manufacturer.152 Together, these statements indicate that Congress intended to take these decisions away

144. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6347.
145. Id. at 6–7.
146. See id. at 7 (explaining that the Act was intended to give “manufacturers . . . a better sense of their potential litigation obligations”).
147. Id. at 6.
148. This is not uncommon, as “legislative history is itself often murky,
ambiguous, and contradictory.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005).
149. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 25.
150. Id. at 26.
151. Id.
152. See id.
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from trial courts and to make the risk-benefit decisions for the
particular vaccines covered by the Act.
The 1986 report, however, also states that “[v]accine injured persons will now have an appealing alternative to the tort
system,”153 which seems to indicate that Congress did not completely remove any particular cause of action from civil litigation. Furthermore, when enacting legislation to fund the Vaccine Act’s compensation program in 1987, the same committee
that wrote the 1986 report stated that “[i]t is not the Committee’s intention to preclude court actions under applicable law,”
and that the Act did not purport to “decide as a matter of law
the circumstances in which a vaccine should be deemed unavoidably unsafe.”154 While this is technically subsequent legislative history, it may still be entitled to some weight.155
The legislative history reveals a plethora of statements
that can be construed to support either argument.156 While it is
apparent that there is no clear statement of legislative intent
with respect to who decides whether a vaccine is beneficial
enough to warrant its risks, Congress has made it clear
through its behavior with respect to vaccination programs in
the United States that it intended to assume the role as decisionmaker.
3. Congress Acts as Decisionmaker
Reading the Act “against the backdrop of regulatory activity”157 elucidates Congress’s intent to decide vaccine policy.
Congress has a lengthy history of enacting vaccine-specific legislation to promote particular vaccines. Examples include the
Poliomyelitis Vaccination Assistance Act of 1955,158 the Vaccination Assistance Act of 1962,159 the National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976,160 and most recently, the Public

153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391(I), at 691 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-364, 2313-365.
155. Shah, supra note 118, at 232.
156. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. H9943-02, at 29 (1986) (statement of Rep.
Henry Waxman) (stating that an individual may bring a civil claim if an “inadequately researched” vaccine causes an injury).
157. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519 (1992).
158. Pub. L. No. 84 -377, 69 Stat. 704 (1955).
159. Pub. L. No. 87-868, 76 Stat. 1155 (1962).
160. Pub. L. No. 94 -380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976).
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Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act.161 Moreover, when Congress chose to encourage certain pediatric vaccines, it knew not only that these vaccines were not entirely
safe,162 but that some of them even had safer alternatives. For
example, the federal government chose for its public immunization program the Sabin Polio vaccine over the safer, but arguably less effective, Salk vaccine.163 When the Vaccine Act was
passed, Congress continued to promote the usefulness of the
DTP vaccine containing whole-cell pertussis, despite the knowledge that an acellular design was already being used
abroad.164 Even though some children would suffer adverse
reactions from this vaccine, the federal government continued
to support mandated vaccination for all school-aged children
because it considered the benefits of the imperfect vaccine to
outweigh the risks of going unvaccinated.165
Notably, these decisions to promote less safe vaccine designs are consistent with the Vaccine Act’s adoption of comment k, which justifies the use of beneficial products that cannot be made safe.166 A vaccine that cannot be made safe may be
“unavoidably unsafe” even if it could be made safer, where use
of the less safe product is best for public policy. Congress has
already made such public policy decisions with respect to certain vaccines.167

161. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2005). The PREP Act provides tort immunity for
manufacturers of vaccines deemed necessary to prevent a public health crisis.
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act Questions and Answers, U.S.
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/
legal/prepact/pages/prepqa.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). Recently, this has
been extended to include protection for manufacturers of the H1N1 Influenza
vaccine. Pandemic Influenza Vaccines—Amendment, 74 Fed. Reg. 30,294
(June 25, 2009).
162. No vaccine is entirely safe. CDC, supra note 42, at 1.
163. See Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1320–22 (Kan.
1986) (discussing the history of polio vaccines).
164. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 18 tbl.1 (recommending the DTP vaccine for infants and children); id. at 38 (describing efforts
to develop an acellular pertussis vaccine and the Japanese success with such a
vaccine). The whole-cell vaccine is associated with adverse events such as local
inflammatory reactions, vomiting, protracted crying, convulsions, and severe
neurological disease. INST. OF MED., supra note 32, at 69–71. Unlike the “undesirably crude and reactive” whole-cell vaccine, the acellular vaccine contains
only two protein antigens from the pertussis bacterium and causes fewer side
effects. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 38.
165. Willett, supra note 50, at 396.
166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Congress has also directly and indirectly authorized various agencies and groups to conduct investigations of each vaccine and its related injuries. For example, the ACIP168 evaluates each recommended vaccine, utilizing data from a
multitude of sources, and uses this information to guide the
other federal vaccine programs.169 ACIP’s guidance extends to
the selection of appropriate vaccines, proper use of each vaccine, and creation of a list of vaccines to administer to children
through the VFC program.170 ACIP’s deliberations “include
consideration of population based studies such as efficacy, cost
benefit, and risk benefit analyses.”171 NVAC172 also plays a role
in vaccine development, research, and administration.173 NVAC
advises the Assistant Secretary for Health with respect to vaccination safety and supply for both pediatric and adult populations, as well as with respect to specific vaccine issues.174
The recent preemption cases in the realm of pharmaceuticals and medical devices place a great deal of weight on the
presumption against preemption.175 This presumption predominantly applies “in areas of traditional state regulation,” where
out of respect for state sovereignty, the Court presumes that
“Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”176 Traditionally, issues of safety and health fall within
the ambit of State regulation.177 The states, however, have a
168. See ACIP Charter, supra note 44 (setting forth the statutory authority
for the ACIP).
169. See CDC, supra note 42, at 1.
170. See ACIP Charter, supra note 44.
171. Id. The ACIP’s “recommendations for vaccination practices balance
scientific evidence of benefits for each person and to society against the potential costs and risks for vaccination for the individual and programs.” CDC, supra note 42.
172. See National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC), supra note 134.
173. Id.
174. For a list of many of NVAC’s reports and recommendations, see Reports, Recommendations, and Resolutions, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/reports/index.html (last visited Oct.
17, 2010).
175. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 –95 (2009) (relying
upon the presumption to find that there is no implied preemption for failureto-warn claims); Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (applying the
presumption to find that design defect claims for medical devices that have not
undergone pre-market approval are not preempted).
176. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.
177. See id. (noting “the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of
health and safety”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756
(1985) (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873) (explaining that
the States traditionally “legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs,
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minimal role in vaccination policy compared to that of the federal government.178 Although the states have discretion in administering vaccination programs and creating state-specific
vaccination mandates,179 the federal government is the predominant funding source for these programs180 and the states’ vaccination policies derive from the ACIP’s recommendations.181 In
practice, therefore, the federal government makes all major
vaccine-related policy decisions and the states merely choose
how to implement those policies.
The federal government recognizes that it has the obligation to provide the states with vaccines182 and that states are
only an “adjunct in carrying out the Federal government’s responsibility to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.”183
Through the various vaccine programs, such as the VFC and
Section 317 Immunization Grant programs, the federal government has expended tremendous amounts of resources to
supply vaccines to the states.184 The federal government is
more than a mere financier of vaccination programs—it also
mandates pediatric vaccination programs as a condition of rehealth, comfort, and quiet” of their residents)); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977) (“[T]he State has broad police powers in regulating
the administration of drugs by health professionals.”).
178. For a discussion of the expansive role of the federal government in
vaccination policy, see supra notes 32–53 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., CDC, supra note 26, at 2 (discussing a report of “state laws,
regulations, or rules that impose vaccination requirements” for children). The
vaccine requirements are categorized by state. Id.
180. Most states depend primarily upon federal programs, such as the VFC
and Section 317 Immunization Grant programs, to provide vaccines for their
residents. INST. OF MED., CALLING THE SHOTS: IMMUNIZATION FINANCE
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 8 (2000).
181. States’ immunization schedules are often derived directly from the
ACIP’s recommendations. See, e.g., MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, HISTORY OF THE
MINNESOTA SCHOOL IMMUNIZATION LAW (2004), available at http://www
.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/immunize/laws/history.pdf (explaining that Minnesota’s immunization laws have been amended so as to be consistent with the
ACIP’s recommendations); TEX. DEP’T OF STATE HEALTH SERVS., RECOMMENDED IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE FOR PERSONS AGED 0 THROUGH 6 YEARS
(2010), available at http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/immunize/docs/6-105.pdf (reprinting CDC’s immunization schedule for Texas pediatric population).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(a)(2)(A) (2006).
183. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6346.
184. See INST. OF MED., supra note 180, at 8 (explaining that in fiscal year
1999 alone, the federal government spent more than $600 million in vaccine
supplies through the VFC and section 317 programs). For specific amounts
awarded to each state between 1995 and 1999, see id. at 272–81.
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ceiving other federal assistance.185 Furthermore, the U.S. vaccination program itself is commonly called a “national immunization system”186 with the NVPO187 at the helm. The sheer
amount of federal legislation dealing with preventing the
spread of infectious disease and encouraging immunization only further undermines the argument that vaccination is, or has
ever been, an area of traditional state control.188 In fact, the
Secretary of HHS has explicit statutory authority to take
measures to prevent the transmission or spread of communicable diseases between states.189
The federal government has an overwhelming interest in
national vaccination programs and the states play a secondary
role when it comes to making vaccine policy decisions. Regulation to promote immunization and combat the spread of communicable diseases is not only implicitly, but explicitly, within
the scope of the federal government’s authority. This, therefore,
is not one of those traditional areas of state regulation to which
the presumption against preemption applies.
The Vaccine Act, through its adoption of comment k, requires a risk-benefit analysis for each federally recommended
vaccine and its potential adverse effects before granting liability immunity for vaccine manufacturers. Although the legislative history of the Vaccine Act is unclear as to who should conduct this inquiry, the Vaccine Act itself provides a large role for
the federal government in making vaccine-related decisions,
and the federal government has demonstrated throughout history an eagerness to assume this role. Congress has already
made this determination with respect to most, if not all, cur185. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(62) (2006) (requiring any state requesting
medical assistance to implement an immunization program for all pediatric
vaccines for all vaccine-eligible children); id. § 1396s(a)(2)(A) (requiring “each
State [to] establish a pediatric vaccine distribution program”). The required
pediatric vaccines are established by the ACIP. Id. § 1396s(e), (h)(6).
186. INST. OF MED., supra note 180, at 54 (describing changes and problems in the “national immunization system”) (emphasis added).
187. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
188. It has also been argued that the federal government has a “particularly strong” interest in matters relating to other pharmaceutical products, and
that the “mantra” that health and safety regulation is a local concern “is a
holdover from the days before the federal government became a major financier of medical costs.” David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability for Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common
Law, and Other Paths to Uniform Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 411 (1996).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2006).
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rent childhood vaccines on the market. It has successfully developed policies, procedures, agencies, and programs designed
to conduct the necessary risk-benefit analyses, make vaccinerelated recommendations, and implement these recommendations throughout the country. Furthermore, conferring this
power on Congress, rather than on state courts, does not offend
current preemption jurisprudence because national immunization policy is hardly a traditional state matter.
III. CHILDHOOD VACCINE LITIGATION IS PREEMPTED
Congress is the appropriate decisionmaker with respect to
vaccine policy and has already conducted the necessary riskbenefit analyses for recommended childhood vaccines so as to
qualify them as “unavoidably unsafe.” This Part demonstrates
that Congress is better suited than courts and juries to make
these types of decisions. Although preempting design defect
claims against manufacturers raises some safety concerns, the
consequences of adverse jury rulings outweigh these potential
safety issues. Thus, any court that faces a design defect claim
involving a recommended childhood vaccine should find the
claim preempted.
A. CONGRESS IS BEST SUITED TO MAKE VACCINE POLICY
DECISIONS
Congress is in a unique position and is particularly well
suited for making decisions that would profoundly affect the
nation’s vaccination programs. First, Congress has the benefit
of pooling the resources of many different government and nongovernment agencies, including the agencies within the HHS,
(the CDC, NIH, FDA, and HRSA), other federal entities (the
Department of Defense, USAID, NVPO’s Inter-Agency Vaccine
Group (IAVG), and NVAC), as well as various global organizations, consumer groups, and academic institutions.190 Congress
can take advantage of the FDA’s extensive involvement in premarket and post-market regulation of vaccines191 by using the
information garnered through the FDA approval process in conjunction with information obtained from other specialized programs devoted to researching vaccine benefits and safety. Existing safety monitoring programs include those established in

190. National Vaccine Program Office, supra note 34.
191. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
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subpart C of the Vaccine Act,192 the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System,193 the Vaccine Safety Datalink Project,194 and
other programs coordinated through the CDC’s Immunization
Safety Office.195 The utilization of a variety of public and private resources may compensate for any areas in which the
FDA’s surveillance system may be lacking.196 Involvement of
vaccine manufacturers in this process can help assure that
those with the best access to information about these products
are involved in the post-marketing research and surveillance.197
Juries, on the other hand, are poorly equipped to deal with
such matters. A jury does not enjoy access to the same wealth
of information that is available to Congress and may erroneously rely upon faulty scientific studies that lack adequate support.198 The information a jury can consider is constrained by
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-25 to -28 (1986).
193. Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), CDC http://www
.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/Activities/VAERS.html (last modified Dec. 9, 2009).
194. Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD) Project, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/
vaccinesafety/Activities/VSD.html (last modified Feb. 17, 2010).
195. About the Immunization Safety Office, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/
vaccinesafety/Activities/About_ISO.html (last modified Mar. 23, 2010).
196. Some people have criticized the current post-marketing surveillance
system for being too weak, unreliable, and underfunded. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-866, HIGHLIGHTS OF NEW DRUG APPROVAL:
FDA NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS OVERSIGHT OF DRUGS APPROVED ON THE BASIS
OF SURROGATE ENDPOINTS (2009) (“Weaknesses in FDA’s monitoring and enforcement processes hamper its ability to effectively oversee postmarketing
studies.”); Catherine D. DeAngelis & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Prescription Drugs,
Products Liability, and Preemption of Tort Litigation, 300 JAMA 1939, 1940–
41 (2008) (describing flaws in the current postmarketing surveillance system
and saying that “[t]he FDA is not infallible” and does not have a “crystal ball”
with which it can foresee all possible risks); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and
the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of
Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 600–06 (2005) (describing areas in which the FDA’s postmarketing surveillance are deficient). But
see Losing Momentum, supra note 14, at 44 (statement of Wayne Pisano, Executive Vice President, Aventis Pasteur North America) (“The FDA/CDC regulatory regimen is comprehensive and well established.”); Geiger & Rosen, supra
note 188, at 396 (arguing that the FDA’s extensive regulation is sufficient).
197. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009) (“[M]anufacturers
have superior access to information about their drugs, especially in the postmarketing phase as new risks emerge.”); Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So.
2d 728, 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“[A] drug manufacturer is in a better
position to monitor the current state of knowledge and technology, as applied
to its products, than is the FDA.”).
198. For example, the groundbreaking study that linked the measles,
mumps, and rubella vaccine to autism has recently been retracted as dishonest and unethical. Gardiner Harris, Journal Retracts 1998 Paper Linking Au-
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the “inherent limitations of the trial process,” such as rules of
evidence and the talents of a few attorneys.199 Furthermore, a
jury is disproportionately exposed to the harmful effects a vaccine design had on a plaintiff, while the thousands of people
who benefitted from the vaccine are underrepresented.200 Additionally, a jury may have difficulty finding in favor of “big business” when an innocent, injured child would have to bear the
loss.201 This is why Congress, and not juries, is responsible for
conducting the cost-benefit analyses that affect both individual
safety and national policy.
Second, congressional decisionmaking is conducive to providing the uniformity and predictability that is needed to maintain the stability of the vaccine market. The driving forces behind the Vaccine Act in 1986 were this sort of unpredictability,202 and the necessity for a “consistent national policy
in protecting our children against preventable diseases.”203
When manufacturers are unable to predict their potential liability, they may become more hesitant to enter or remain in the
market.204 If they do continue marketing their products, they
will inevitably face higher insurance premiums and will recoup
litigation and insurance expenses by raising vaccine prices,
thus hindering access to vaccines.205 Jury determinations of a
vaccine’s risks and benefits, on a case-by-case basis, offer the
manufacturers no clarity on their liability in future cases.206
tism to Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A9, available at 2010 WLNR
2234157.
199. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98 (Utah 1991).
200. Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008).
201. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6367. But see Struve, supra note 196, at 590 (stating that juries are not
overly eager to award damages against business defendants).
202. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7.
203. Id. at 5.
204. See Kellen F. Cloney, Note, AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers v. Tort Regime: The Need for Alternatives, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 559, 570 (explaining
that “strict liability encourages timidity on the part of manufacturers because
of the uncertainty of what may be found to be a defect”).
205. These types of litigation-driven price increases were a major factor in
passing the Vaccine Act. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at
60–66 (discussing the drastic rise in vaccine prices leading up to the Vaccine
Act); H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6 (explaining that manufacturers were having
difficulty procuring affordable product liability insurance as a result of the increasing numbers of lawsuits).
206. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98 (Utah 1991) (finding
that a trial court is not the proper forum in which to conduct a risk-benefit
analysis of a drug).
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Such unpredictable assessments of a vaccine’s risks and benefits threaten the supply of vaccines and continued vitality of
the national vaccine program.
Additionally, a system in which each state has a different
requirement for vaccine design would reduce the likelihood that
such products would ever be developed. Vaccine research and
development is complex and time-consuming, and manufacturers may simply be unable to “tailor their complex products and
product descriptions to fifty-plus different jurisdictions.”207 Imagine the difficulties vaccine manufacturers would face if they
were required to use a different preservative for their vaccines
in each state or if some states required some components that
were banned in other states. While today the issue might be the
use of thimerosal as a preservative, it is easily foreseeable that
in the near future other preservatives or vaccine components
could be attacked, too.208 Vaccine manufacturers cannot be expected to overhaul their product design with every new jury
verdict. Even if manufacturers could and were willing to design
different vaccines for each state, the increased delays and costs
of vaccine production and marketing would harm the public.209
B. ARE WE SACRIFICING SAFETY FOR SUPPLY?
The strongest argument for preserving tort litigation for
vaccine designs is that such litigation is necessary to maintain
and improve the safety of vaccines. It is possible that granting
“blanket immunity from tort liability would remove an incentive for developing safer designs.”210 Furthermore, tort law may
help serve as a useful adjunct to FDA surveillance, filling in

207. Geiger & Rosen, supra note 188, at 396.
208. For example, the preservative phenol “is corrosive and causes chemical
burns” and can cause “systemic poisoning.” Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH HUM. SERVICES, http://www.atsdr
.cdc.gov/mhmi/mmg115.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2010). Another agent used
in vaccines, 2-phenoxyethanol, also may cause serious injuries. Daniel Dunkin,
2-Phenoxyethanol: A Toxic Vaccine Antibacterial, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (July
23, 2008), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/887293/2phenoxyethanol_
a_toxic_vaccine_antibacterial.html?cat=5.
209. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) (explaining that withholding a drug from the public until all dangerous side effects are
known “would not serve the public welfare,” and that “public policy favors the
development and marketing of beneficial new drugs” even when there are serious risks involved).
210. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 242 (Ga. 2008).
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gaps in FDA regulation211 and assisting the FDA in its task of
monitoring vaccine safety.212
Although litigation might incentivize continued research
and testing,213 these safety incentives already exist.214 The FDA
can revoke licenses if it discovers that a product is unsafe215
and the Vaccine Act itself mandates continued research and reporting.216 There is no need to impose litigation on top of already demanding requirements and effective incentives. This is
best demonstrated by the fact that even in the absence of design defect claims in the years since the Vaccine Act was
enacted, vaccines remain safer than ever.217
Meanwhile, the costs of preserving this avenue of litigation
are enormous. A single jury verdict finding a particular vaccine
to be defective in design could deprive all residents of that state
the ability to obtain that vaccination, at least during the time it
would take to develop and obtain FDA approval of an alternate
design.218 Any business-savvy manufacturer would immediately remove its product from that jurisdiction in order to avoid
continued liability exposure.219 Replacement of a “defective”
vaccine can take years, since the altered product would have to
undergo a complete round of testing and licensure.220 Deprivation of one state’s residents of a vaccine has broader implications than just the public health of that state. Communicable
diseases spread across state lines easily, and an unvaccinated
population in one state can easily affect the health and lives of
residents of every other state.221 It is the federal government’s
211. See DeAngelis & Fontanarosa, supra note 196, at 1939.
212. See Struve, supra note 196, at 591.
213. Okianer Christian Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986 the Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 838 (1988).
214. See Paul A. Offit, Lawsuits Won’t Stop Pandemics, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,
2005, at A16 (arguing that tort litigation plays no role in pushing vaccine
manufacturers to produce better, safer vaccines).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(A) (2006).
216. Id. § 300aa-25 (2006).
217. Immunization Vaccine Safety, CDC (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.cdc
.gov/vaccines/pubs/downloads/f_vacsafe.pdf (“The United States currently has
the safest, most effective vaccine supply in history.”).
218. Willett, supra note 50, at 397.
219. See id.
220. Losing Momentum, supra note 14, at 40 (statement of Wayne Pisano,
Executive Vice President, Aventis Pasteur North America) (explaining that
“[a]ny change to a vaccine is a complex endeavor” and that it takes about two
years to replace an existing product).
221. For example, in 1994, one out-of-state tourist at a ski resort caused an
outbreak of measles affecting 247 people in nine different states. CDC, Inter-
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role to prevent the spread of communicable diseases,222 and it is
not sound public policy to allow one jury to risk the lives of all
Americans.
C. DESIGN DEFECT LITIGATION SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED
The real policy question underlying this debate is simply
whether it is worth risking the loss of all vaccines from the
market for at least a few years, or possibly forever, in order to
preserve the slim effect design defect litigation has on incentivizing safety improvements. The answer is a resounding no.
There are already numerous incentives to encourage continued
research and reporting of vaccine safety. The potential incremental increased incentive that litigation might provide is not
worth the enormous public health consequences it entails.
Protecting vaccine manufacturers does not mean those injured by vaccines will have no recourse. They continue to have
access to the Vaccine Court and they may continue to assert
tort claims other than design defect where appropriate. If the
Vaccine Act’s compensation system is not functioning adequately,223 then Congress can make the necessary changes that will
improve that system so as to provide faster or easier compensation to victims of vaccines.224 Meanwhile, it is better to err on
the side of protecting the nation from a resurgence of communicable diseases, than it is to err on the side of preserving a
particular tort claim for a select group of individuals at the expense of the national vaccine supply.
Through examining the numerous federal legislative acts
governing vaccine policy, as well as the broad scheme of federal
control over the national immunization program, it becomes
apparent that Congress has already taken charge of the policy
decisions involving childhood vaccine research and administrastate Measles Transmission from a Ski Resort—Colorado, 1994, 43 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 627, 627 (1994).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2006).
223. It is debatable whether the compensation system is satisfactory. Compare The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is It Working as
Congress Intended? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th
Cong. 6–13, 140–45 (2001) (statement of Rep. Dan Burton) (claiming that the
program is working as Congress intended), with The Continuing Oversight of
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 95–98 (2002) (statement of Ron Homer,
Attorney) (critiquing the program as too adversarial).
224. Congress has evaluated the Vaccine Program on several occasions,
making various changes. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-977 (2000) (recommending improvements to the Vaccine Program).
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tion. Therefore, while the Vaccine Act does not preempt all vaccine design defect litigation, it does preempt design defect litigation for the federally encouraged routine childhood vaccines.
These vaccines have already undergone the required case-bycase analysis and any court facing a claim involving one of
these vaccines should find the claim preempted.
CONCLUSION
Vaccines are one of the most important medical advancements in history. The federal government has greatly contributed to the success of the nation’s immunization efforts
through vaccine-related legislation and the creation of federal
agencies tasked with evaluating the safety and effectiveness of
routine childhood vaccines. This success, however, has recently
been threatened by litigation concerning the preemptive scope
of the Vaccine Act. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth presents the question of
whether the Act preempts all design defect claims or instead
requires a case-by-case analysis of each vaccine. The parties,
unfortunately, completely ignore the question of whether the
required case-by-case analysis has already been performed with
respect to routine childhood vaccines.
The Act’s use of the word “unavoidable” suggests that some
case-by-case analysis is required before design defect litigation
can be precluded, but the appropriate body for conducting this
analysis is Congress and the institutions and agencies through
which it works. Congress has always taken the lead in regulating national vaccine policy and must continue to do so to ensure
the stability that is required to maintain the supply of vaccines
in the market. Not all vaccine-related design defect claims are
preempted by the Vaccine Act, but such claims related to routine, federally encouraged childhood vaccines are preempted.
Congress has already determined that the benefits of these
vaccines outweigh their risk, thus rendering them “unavoidably
unsafe.”
Allowing such design defect claims could cripple the nation’s immunization programs. This is an unacceptable risk
considering that those individuals harmed by such vaccines already have an adequate means of recompense. Any court facing
this question should find that these design defect claims are
preempted. If Congress changes its position and decides that
public policy does not favor the surrender of such claims, it can
easily address this with new legislation, perhaps more clearly
drafted.

